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ABSTRACT
Fake Malware Classification with CNN via Image Conversion: A Game Theory
Approach
by Yash Sahasrabuddhe
Improvements in malware detection techniques have grown significantly over
the past decade. These improvements have resulted in better security for systems
from various forms of malware attacks. However, it is also the reason for continuous
evolution of malware which makes it harder for current security mechanisms to
detect them. Hence, there is a need to understand different malwares and study
classification techniques using the ever-evolving field of machine learning. The goal of
this research project is to identify similarities between malware families and to improve
on classification of malwares within different malware families by implementing
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) on their executable files. Moreover, there are
different algorithms through which we can resize images. Classifying these malware
images will help us understand effectiveness of the techniques. As malwares evolve
continuously, we will generate fake malware image samples using Auxiliary Classifier
Generative Adversarial Network (AC-GANs) and jumble the original dataset to try
and break the CNN classifier.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malwares are software programs designed to perform specific malicious tasks
to harm computer systems as well as users. This can be done by gaining access to
sensitive information or gaining unauthorized control to systems. Malwares can be of
any form such as - viruses, ransomwares or trojan horses [1]. They are usually present
in unsolicited softwares, or even through links which are made attractive in the hope
that a user clicks on it on the web. Once they are inside a system, they replicate and
infect the system itself.
To protect ourselves from such intrusions, malware detection and classification
has become of utmost importance. There are several anti-malware softwares which
help us to detect such attacks and prevent them from happening. There are various
approaches behind the curtains of such software. Most of them are signature-based
solutions where the files are scanned for a particular signature. However, evading these
types of solution is easy for hackers if they use morphed codes or other obfuscation
techniques [2]. One such approach is to detect and classify them using machine
learning techniques. If we have a pre-trained model which can classify malwares, then
classifying a new data point is a task which can be completed very efficiently.
As the detection and classification of malwares into their families is improving
continuously, hackers are also able to come up with new techniques to hide the
maliciousness of malwares more precisely. This has led to a game theory like problem
whereas classification techniques grow stronger, so do the malwares and they become
more difficult to recognize by the detection and classification techniques which were
in place. Hence, understanding the nature of malwares themselves can help with
classification techniques. Machine Learning, therefore, provides us with a unique
solution where the software models can learn the characteristics of malwares themselves
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to predict never seen before malwares which are based on similar set of properties [3].
Initial approaches for classification which used machine learning techniques were
based on Hidden Markov Models (HMMs). For example, in [4] malware samples were
classified as either benign or malign using HMM. One of the major steps in using HMM
is to extract opcode sequences of the samples. HMM then tries to probabilistically
determine the state sequences using which we can classify new samples.
Other techniques like Support Vector Machines (SVMs) were also used as they
grew popular. SVM training is the process of finding a ’n-1’-dimensional plane within
an n-dimensional dataset which could separate the dataset into two classes. The
paper [5] talks about the details of finding this plane using gradient descent approach
to find a solution for the quadratic optimization problem which is set up as part of
this training process.
As we can see, the above techniques need feature extraction so that we can
use them to build a model to classify. CNN, on the other hand, takes data as the
input itself and tries to learn the characteristics of the data by re-computing weights
between neurons. This implicit learning of data features makes it very suitable to
use for classification and detection techniques where there not much information
about the data itself. [6] also comments that the removal of human interference on
feature extraction is one of the factors why CNN is a stronger classifier than the
other techniques. Moreover, CNNs work better on images because of their high
dimensionality.
In this research, we will try to leverage these advantages of CNNs in malware
classification. We will first convert the malware executable files into images so that we
can use CNN. We will then try to understand the relation between different families
using the results of the experiments. Finally, we will try to generate fake malware
samples using a Auxiliary Classifier Generative Adversarial Network (AC-GAN) and
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poison our original dataset to observe the effect on our older data. These fake samples
will then be used as a part of the training process of CNN to build a stronger classifier.
The structure of the report is as follows: In Chapter 2, we will first look at the
background of malware classification using machine learning. We will also provide a
brief overview of previous works which were performed on similar lines. In Chapter 3,
we will look at the details of our dataset, the concepts of the techniques which we
will be using and discuss their implementations. In Chapter 4, we will look at the
results of our experiments and its analysis. Lastly, in Chapter 5, we will conclude our
research and discuss potential future work.
3
CHAPTER 2
History & Related Work
2.1 History
Malwares have grown a lot since the turn of 21st century. The paper [?] shows
that the number of intrusions recorded the in the year 2005 grew exponentially from
the past year. Early mechanisms to detect such malwares was a task which needed
heavy computation. One such approach was to detect malware intrusion by assessing
the sequence of system calls made by a program [7]. The paper [8] talks about
classifying malwares using Hamming distances. Another approach is discussed in [9]
where the common subplot of graph is used to classify the data points into their
families.
Early malware classification approaches made use of pattern matching algo-
rithms [10]. As the need of detecting malwares grew, research became broader and
newer terchniques started to evolve, one of them being machine learning. As a result of
the growth of stronger detection techniques, hackers developed more resilient malwares
which made it difficult for the traditional machine learning classification techniques to
classify them. Hackers came up with different techniques to try to hide malwares from
the detection mechanisms. One such technique was to morph a malware into different
forms. In [11], the author used pHMM technique was used to for classification by
removing certain opcodes which were believed to be leading the morphed nature of
malwares.
2.2 Related Work
After the successes seen in detection techniques which used machine learning,
new ways to classify malwares grew with evolution of machine learning. Neural
Networks have shown promising classification results with various malware datasets.
The high dimensionality of images makes image classification an ideal problem for
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CNNs. [12] talks about conversion of malware executables into images so that CNN
can be leveraged to acheive higher accuracies in classification of malwares of various
families.
In [13], the authors created grayscale images using a local mean method. They
used them to classify the malwares using K-means techniques. [14] used Microsoft’s
dataset which is available through Kaggle. The authors implemented ensemble
techniques with boosting. [15] and [16] also discuss about leveraging CNNs for multi-
class classification. In the former, a character-level approach is used in CNN along
with other techniques whereas in the latter, an analysis of classification is performed
on two different datasets.
In [17], the author experimented on the Malimg dataset using CNN and ELM
techniques and achieved high accuracy in the multi-class classfiication. These reviews
and reading helped to understand different approaches taken to classify different
malware datasets. Furthermore, in [18] GANs are implemented in an approach which
is called as MalGAN where the output from GAN is fed to another feedforward
network which makes the final classification if the sample is benign or not. Auxiliary
Classifier GAN was a concept first provided in [19] where every generated sample





In this chapter, we will look at the dataset used for the experiments in detail. Then
we discuss the techniques used in the project, including image generation algorithms.
Finally, we briefly describe the approach for experiments which were performed in
this project. Python was used as the primary language for performing the experiments
in this project due to its powerful library functions and ease of use.
3.1 Data
The dataset used in this project comprises of executable malware files which were
consolidated by an alum. There are a total of 24545 files which belong to 18 families
of malwares. The details of the number of samples from each of those 18 families can
be seen in Table 1. Samples from each malware family are stored in its own directory
with a main root directory providing access to all the families.
3.1.1 Malware Families
Let us look at the malware families individually and discuss them in brief-
alureon is a Trojan virus. These malwares monitor network traffic and steal
sensitive information by scanning for passwords, credit card data [20].
bho is a Browser Helper Object which is a type of malware which presents itself
through advertisements. When a user clicks on an advertisement, these programs
install the BHO trojan which then changes browser settings, looks for sensitive
information and tracks browsing behavior so that similar adwares can display more
attractive ads leading to other malwares [21].
ceeinject is another Trojan virus where the intention of the malware is to hide the
underlying malicious program by obfuscating it. The hidden malware can attack the
6
Table 1: Malware Sample Breakdown



















system in any number of ways. The core is to hide it itself. This is done in such
fashion that it attempts to undetected to the anti-virus software [22].
cycbot is a malware whose characteristics are that it gives a backdoor access to the
infected system. This allows the hackers to install or uninstall programs on the
system, retrieve information from them, update existing programs or even visit web
links. The backdoor access means it goes undetected by the detection systems which
are in place. They can also be used to launch Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [23].
delfinject is an access point malware. These are generally used to gain access to
systems through backdoor mechanisms. Once it is successful, a hacker can install
unwanted software on the system. The initial access occurs when a user visits
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unsolicited web links or other malicious websites [24].
fakerean is installed on a system through careless installation of softwares.
FakeRean malware does not infect a system but rather impersonates anti-virus
softwares with fake logos and interfaces. The program then scans your computer and
displays some files as infected files and asks the user to pay the owner of the software
in order to clean the system. Such malicious programs are categorized as FakeRean
malwares [25].
hotbar is an adware where the malware gets installed on the system and installs its
own malicious components by changing the appearance of other applications. The
malware is then capable of tracking the information flowing through those
applications which leads to encountering more ads throughout the time you are
browsing [26].
lolyda is a trojan malware which is specifically found in gaming. They usually
extract the gaming account information. They may even be responsible for random
files being installed on the system [27].
obfuscator is a malware which as the name suggests, tries to hide underlying
malicious program which can be anything. Such malwares are programmed in such a
way that these help other malwares go undetected from anti-virus softwares [28].
onlinegames is a family of harmful malwares which usually gains access by
installation of softwares especially games through false resources. Once they are in
the system, they can record keyboard behavior, modify, and install additional
malicious programs and steal information [29].
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rbot are backdoor trojans which usually affect through network. It launches its
attack based on weak passwords and they can be the cause of DoS attacks while
retrieving user information as well [30].
renos is similar to FakeRean where a spyware tells the user that the system is
infected and requests for money to clean the system even though there might not be
any other malicious content present in the system [31].
startpage are very unpredictable and usually change browser settings through
unauthorized use. They may also be responsible for other malicious installation of
softwares on the system. [32]
vobfus are worms which are responsible for installing other malwares on a system.
They can be transmitted through flash drives or can even be downloaded through
other media [33].
vundo is another adware where unrelated ads are displayed to the users while
browsing. These tend to be access points to BHO malwares [34].
winwebsec is like ransomware where the winwebsec malware displays that the
system is infected through a malicious software and locks other applications or the
system itself and asks the user to pay to clean the system even though there aren’t
any other infected files. It may also affect other applications and be the cause of DoS
attacks from within the system where it blocks usage of websites [35].
zbot is a trojan virus which attacks systems with the intent to steal sensitive
information about users. They can also be responsible for providing a remote access
of your system to the hacker(s) [36].
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zeroaccess is another rootkit malware which remains hidden and is responsible for
pay-per-click fraud. It attacks by retrieving information from browsers while user
surfs the internet. This is done through advertising their own network and retrieving
information from other middle men and web traffic [37].
3.1.2 Image Conversion
Since the focus of this research project is to leverage the advantages neural
networks, we convert the executable samples into grayscale images to increase their
dimensionality. To do this, we converted each byte of the bytecode sequence of the
executable files into their ASCII value and added this stream of data to a 2D array.
These values represent a grayscale image, and a corresponding image is saved in a
directory. All this can be done using the image.save API from PIL.
After this process was completed, we needed the size of the images of all malwares
to be consistent. We chose 64x64 as an ideal choice since the model will not become
heavy due to a big size but will have enough information so that the model can
learn some features of each family. This choice was bolstered after reading [38] paper
in which the author achieved good results with these dimensions for a lightweight
classifier.
Hence, to convert the images to 64x64 dimensions, we used the below 2 approaches-
1. Using PIL Image Library Filters:
This library provides the APIs to resize an input image to a desired dimension
using different filters like-
HAMMING - Produces sharper pixels based on Hamming interpolation.
Has better performance but the image quality is not the best.
BICUBIC - Performs a cubic interpolation between all contributing pixels
to determine the resulting pixel’s value. Lower performance than Hamming
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filter but the quality is better.
LANCZOS - Determines the resulting pixel’s value based on a high quality
Lanczos filter which is a truncated sinc filter. It produces high quality images
but lags on its performance.





2. Reading NxN amount of bytes
As it was seen from the results of the paper [39], the use of headers of malware
executables also results in great classification results. Hence, using this as a
benchmark, we will read only a certain number of bytes from the malware file
and construct an image from this data itself. Since we are building 64x64 images
we will read the first 4096 bytes from the malware executable file and create a
grayscale image.
3.2 Technical Concepts
In this section, we will look briefly investigate the concepts of the techniques
which have been used in this project. We will also describe the architecture and the
optimum parameters that were found for setting up the experiments.
3.2.1 Hidden Markov Model
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is based on the Markov process in which the
Markov chain is basically a set of hidden states. The goal of the algorithm is to
compute likelihood of transitions between the hidden states. This can be done by
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observing the states from the observation sequence which are probabilistically linked
to the hidden states. The Figure 1 depicts a high-level architecture of HMMs.
Figure 1: High Level Illustration of HMM
Table 3 shows a subset of notations that are generally used in HMM. [40].
Table 3: HMM Notations
Sybmbol Meaning
A Hidden State Transition Probabilities
B Observation Probability Matrix
𝜋 Initial State Distribution
O Observation Sequence
N Number of Hidden States
M Unique Observation Symbols
The probability distribution of the hidden states is represented in A matrix whose
dimensions are based on the number of hidden states. The observation sequence is
denoted by the symbol ‘O’. The probability of each data point i.e., an observation, to
occur against a particular hidden state is calcualted in the ‘B’matrix. Therefore, the
dimension of this matrix is a 2-D matrix which is of size N x M.
There are three classic problems which can be solved using HMM - first, to score
12
an observation sequence based on a given trained model, second, to uncover the hidden
states and finding their optimal state transition probabilities, and third, to train a
model 𝜆 which fits the sequence of observations.
The training of the model from problem 3 is done based on a hill climb algorithm
known as the Baum-Welch re-estimation algorithm. The A, B and 𝜋 matrices are
randomly initialized, but are always row stochastic. They are then re-estimated each
step using an Expectation Maximization algorithm (EM) until the training converges
to a local maximum.
3.2.2 Convolutional Neural Networks
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) were first introduced in [41] after back-
propagation techniques for feed-forward neural networks were described from the
book [42] by C.M. Bishop.
The main architecture bases of CNN are shared weights, degree shift and receptive
fields [41]. There are layers of neurons which are fully connected with each other. They
may be of different dimensions where the receiving layer receives a small neighborhood
of inputs which were present in the previous layer. The neurons have a set of inputs
and outputs. A weight is associated with each of those synapses (like a neuron in
brain). A loss or error rate is calculated with each iteration of training. This becomes
a error minimization problem, where we adjust the weights associated with each
input/output between the layers so as to minimize the loss and increase the accuracy.
The re-computation of weights is implemented using a backpropagation approach [41].
The advantages of using CNNs is that it removes the need to extract features
from data and classify using only that set of features. Moreover, extracting features
of high dimensional data like images can be a computationally expensive task. CNN
on the other hand, does not require a set of features specifically. The layers of neural
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networks can extrapolate the information needed to classify data implicitly. Each
neuron has some information which is necessary for the overall result and training of
a CNN model.
For a model to train, there are various types of layers that we can add to the
architecture of a CNN model. We will look into the concepts of some of these layers
in brief. Figure 2 is a high-level depiction of CNN architecture.
Figure 2: Basic CNN Architecture
Let us now look at the different types of layers we can use in a CNN model.
1. Convolution Layer - This layer consists of some number of neurons which have
a tensor input. Tensor input means, the dimensions of the input are determined
by the height, width of the images, number of images and the channels of the
input images. The function of this layer is to convolve the input based on a size
known as kernel size and feed forward the results to the next layer.
2. Max-Pooling Layer - Pooling layers reduce the dimensionality of the input layer
and achieving invariance. Clusters of neurons from input layer for an output of
single neuron using a kernel map of some size. The max pooling layer considers
the maximum value from those clusters as the output as a single neuron [43].
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3. Dropout Layer - A dropout layer is used to regularize the parameters of the
convolutional layers [44]. It randomly sets a percent of inputs to 0. The other
unchanged inputs are scaled so that the overall sum of parameters remains
unchanged.
4. Flatten Layer - This layer is used to convert a multidimensional input into a
single dimensional output of the tensor. This is normally used just before a
dense layer as a single column input to it [45].
5. Dense Layer - The dense layer is a deep layer, i.e., fully connected network
where each neuron present in the network receives an input from the previous
layer. This layer performs matrix multiplications and recomputes the weights of
neurons using backpropagation. An activation function, usually relu, is used to
help the model learn complex patterns by helping to decide if a neuron should
be activated i.e., used as an output or not.
3.2.3 Auxiliary Classifier Generative Adversarial Network
The Auxiliary Classifier Generative Adversarial Networks or AC-GANs are a
development over GANs. The were first introduced in [19] by Augusts Odena,
Christoper Olah and Jonathon Shlens.
GANs are a setup of a generator model and discriminator model which are neural
networks. They are trained in opposition of each other, like a setup of game theory,
where the generator is training to generate better quality of fake data from a noise
input. The discriminator model is a classifier which tries to detect if the generated
fake sample data is real or not. A loss is calculated to determine the gap between
generated fake sample and real data samples. This process goes back and forth until
the discriminator model is not able to distinguish between real and fake data. The
loss is calculated based on the following equation-
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𝐿 = 𝐸[𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃 (𝑆 = 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙)|𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙] + 𝐸[𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃 (𝑆 = 𝑓𝑎𝑘𝑒)|𝑋𝑓𝑎𝑘𝑒] [19] (1)
The discriminator tries to maximize the first term of the above equation whereas
the generator tries to minimize the second term of the above equation. Figure 3 shows
a basic architecture of GANs.
Figure 3: GAN Architecture
AC-GANs is a variant of the above architecture in which the discriminator
produces two outputs. One is whether the generated image is real or fake and to
which class it belongs to. The new architecture is shown in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4: AC-GAN Architecture
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3.3 Approach for Experiments
This section describes the roadmap for experiments which are to be conducted.
As we are using CNN as our main classifier, we need some kind of a benchmark
result to compare the results from CNN. Hence, the first step is to train a basic
HMM model based on their opcodes. We will train winwebsec family as it has the
greatest number of samples available and then test the model against samples from
winwebsec as well as other families. As we have a benchmark, we will then build
CNN model with winwebsec and zbot samples and compute accuracies to validate the
result by comaparing them with HMM results. To do this, we will first convert the
malware executable files into images so that we can provide those as inputs to CNN.
A basic image conversion is performed, and data is reseized using a built-in API. After
we compare the results and tune the model, we can use the same architecture later
experiments as well.
We will now move on to a multi-class classification to classify the 18 families of
malwares on a CNN model and observe its results. We will follow it up with some
further binary classification if necessary, for certain families. Next, we will perform the
same experiment with different datasets generated using the approaches mentioned in
Section 3.1.2.
Now, we will work with our game theory like approach where we will generate
fake samples of malware by setting up an AC-GAN model. For this, we will use the
original converted images dataset, which contains images of variable size, as source for
training as they contain much more information than resized images. After training
the AC-GAN model and generating fake images for all the malware families, we
perform a 36 class (18 real & 18 fake) classification on a subset of data to analyze the
confusion of CNN classifier based on the same architecture as of previous experiments.
This appraoch will lead us to propose our final experiment in which we will create a
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poisoned dataset which will consist of both real and fake samples of each family.
Finally, as this poisoned dataset is created, we will train a CNN model on it
which would complete our game theory in the sense that the inclusion of fake samples
would help us counter the reduction in classification accuracies which we see from the
36-class classification. We will score 3 testing samples based on this trained model -
on real data only, on fake data only and on poisoned test samples which contain both




In this section, we will see the set up for each of the experiments i.e., model
architectures and analyze the results of each of them by observing the confusion
matrices and classification reports generated by the experiments.
4.1 HMM
For the basic classification, we trained an HMM model on winwebsec family
by considering the most used opcodes from the samples. The opcodes define the
dimensions of the ‘B’matrix. The ‘A’matrix is the length of the number of hidden
states we keep for the problem. We performed the experiment with 10000 random
restarts for training. The HMM model uses Baum-Welch re-estimation algorithm and
once the training completes, we scored the samples from other families as well as from
winwebsec. Figure 5 graph shows the results of experiment-
Figure 5: ROC Curve of WinWebSec Classification
As we can see, we score winwebsec samples and samples from different families
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using this model. We get 89% accuracy for this binary classification.
4.2 CNN
We first implement a CNN model based on two families. The architecture which
yielded the best results is shown below in Figure 6. We will use this architecture for
further experiments as well. Table 4 shows the optimum parameters for training a
CNN model.
Figure 6: CNN Architecture
We use all the samples belonging to the winwebsec and zbot samples. The data
is then split into training and testing using the train_test_split library with 70% of
the data for training and the remaining 30% for testing. Figure 7 shows the confusion
matrix of the classification. Table 5 shows the classification report.
20







Loss Function Categorical Crossentropy
Figure 7: Confusion Matrix for 2 Family Classification
Table 5: Classification Report for 2 Families
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support
0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1124
1 0.99 0.99 0.99 507
accuracy 0.99 1631
macro avg 0.99 0.99 0.99 1631
weighted avg 0.99 0.99 0.99 1631
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As we have acheived a better accuracy to that of the HMM results, it can be said
that CNN can be a better classifier. We will now implement a multi-class classification
for all the datasets.
4.2.1 CNN with Full Image Dataset
We use the dataset created by reading all the bytes of the malwares and creating
images of various sizes. This dataset is then loaded to the CNN model using PIL
library’s ImageDataGenerator API. This resizes the images into the target size of
64x64 for our CNN model. The model is trained for 50 epochs using relu activation
for the dense layers as used in the previous experiment. Figure 8 shows the confusion
matrix.
Table 6 shows the classification report.
As we can see, we achieved an 80% accuracy for an 18-class classification which
seems great. But can we do better? Let’s look at the results in the next sections.
4.2.2 CNN with Hamming Images Dataset
As seen earlier, the resizing of the images from the dataset occurs internally
through ImageDataGenerator. As a different approach, we resized the images to 64x64
size using the ‘Hamming’filter on the whole dataset. Figure 9 shows the confusion
matrix achieved for classifying the images based on this filter.
The Table 7 shows the classification report.
As we can see, the maximum accuracy we achieved using Hamming resize for the
images is 86%. We can see the improvement from the previous result which justifies
the use of resize filters.
4.2.3 CNN with Bicubic Images Dataset
We resize the images to 64x64 size using the ‘Bicubic’filter on the whole image
dataset. Figure 10 shows the confusion matrix achieved for classifying the images
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Figure 8: Confusion Matrix on Full Image Data
based on this filter.
The Table 8 below depicts the classification report.
As we can see, the maximum accuracy we achieved using the Bicubic filter for
resizing the images is 85%. We can say that the Hamming filter provides better results
than Bicubic filters.
4.2.4 CNN with Lanczos Images Dataset
We resize the images to 64x64 size using the ‘Lanczos’filter on the whole image
dataset. Figure 11 shows the confusion matrix achieved for classifying the images
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Table 6: Classification Report Full Dataset
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support
0 0.72 0.67 0.69 418
1 0.93 0.94 0.93 343
2 0.75 0.91 0.83 220
3 0.87 0.89 0.88 308
4 0.53 0.52 0.52 360
5 0.70 0.65 0.67 343
6 0.98 0.96 0.97 436
7 0.96 0.99 0.98 274
8 0.31 0.38 0.34 364
9 0.81 0.91 0.86 368
10 0.55 0.39 0.45 440
11 0.77 0.83 0.80 330
12 0.80 0.77 0.78 387
13 0.93 0.94 0.93 288
14 0.68 0.73 0.70 493
15 0.99 0.96 0.98 1150
16 0.95 0.97 0.96 510
17 0.94 0.88 0.91 336
accuracy 0.80 7368
macro avg 0.79 0.79 0.79 7368
weighted avg 0.80 0.80 0.80 7368
based on this filter.
The Table 9 below depicts the classification report.
As we can see, the maximum accuracy we achieved using the Lanczos filter for
resizing the images is 86%.
4.2.5 CNN with Images from NxN bytes Dataset
We create the new dataset by reading the first 4096 bytes of the malware
executables and using these bytes to create images of size 64x64. We classify these
‘header images now using the CNN model. Figure 12 shows the confusion matrix of
the observed results.
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Figure 9: Confusion Matrix on Full Image Data Using Hamming Filter
The Table 10 shows its classification report.
We achieved a 92% accuracy for this dataset. This means that the header
information from the malware executables was enough information to classify them
into each of their classes. This means that in other resizing filters, the information was
getting blurred due to which their accuracy is lower than what we see here. It might
also be interpreted that the whole malware file’s data might make the classification
more complex.
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Table 7: Classification Report: Resized with Hamming
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support
0 0.74 0.77 0.75 381
1 0.95 1.00 0.97 314
2 0.77 0.91 0.83 220
3 0.91 0.98 0.94 278
4 0.62 0.58 0.60 352
5 0.91 0.81 0.86 375
6 0.99 0.98 0.98 480
7 0.99 0.97 0.98 275
8 0.58 0.47 0.52 512
9 0.85 0.92 0.88 347
10 0.67 0.63 0.65 324
11 0.88 0.85 0.86 402
12 0.87 0.92 0.90 336
13 0.97 0.98 0.97 293
14 0.72 0.81 0.77 500
15 0.99 0.99 0.99 1142
16 0.97 0.97 0.97 526
17 0.96 0.97 0.96 311
accuracy 0.86 7368
macro avg 0.85 0.86 0.86 7368
weighted avg 0.86 0.86 0.86 7368
4.3 AC-GAN: The Game Theory Approach
We set up an AC-GAN using PyTorch, leveraging GPUs for faster execution.
Figure 13 & Figure 14 illustrate the architectures of generator and discriminator
models respectively. As mentioned in Section 3.3, we use the full image dataset as
the input for the AC-GAN. Moreover, this sets up the game theory like approach
when we try to induce a negative effect on the previous results by introducing the fake
samples to the classifier. Once we see this negative effect on the accuracies, we will
then try to improve on it by considering these generated fake samples in the training
process as a part of the real dataset, thus creating a "poisoned dataset". This will
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Figure 10: Confusion Matrix on Full Image Data Using Bicubic Filter
lead to an improvement on the classification from previous results.
Table 11 describes the optimum parameters which were used to train the model.
The Figure 15 shows the variation in generator and discriminator loss over the
epochs while training AC-GAN.
4.3.1 CNN on Consolidated Dataset
We generate 500 samples from a generator model which produces a reasonable
discriminator accuracy (around 50%). In the experiment, generators from the range
of batch numbers 7000 to 13000 were producing results which were seen as a fit for
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Table 8: Classification Report: Resized with Bicubic Filter
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support
0 0.77 0.68 0.72 425
1 0.96 0.99 0.98 353
2 0.71 0.93 0.81 216
3 0.92 0.97 0.95 297
4 0.63 0.63 0.63 359
5 0.88 0.76 0.81 395
6 0.97 0.99 0.98 447
7 1.00 0.98 0.99 263
8 0.37 0.57 0.45 278
9 0.84 0.91 0.88 353
10 0.82 0.48 0.61 541
11 0.85 0.92 0.89 366
12 0.82 0.89 0.85 335
13 0.96 0.99 0.97 265
14 0.75 0.73 0.74 561
15 0.99 0.99 0.99 1060
16 0.97 0.96 0.97 523
17 0.95 0.95 0.95 331
accuracy 0.85 7368
macro avg 0.84 0.85 0.84 7368
weighted avg 0.86 0.85 0.85 7368
generation. We generate the samples using the generator model of batch 11600.
After the generation, we will build a consolidated dataset containing 36 classes
of data, 18 fake and 18 real, and see observe how the results are different from the
results in Section 4.2.1. The Figure 16 below shows the confusion matrix for the 36
classes and the Table 12 describes its classification report.
As we can see, the CNN model is not able to classify the samples as precisely as it
was able to before. This is due to the inclusion of these fake samples which has made
it harder for the CNN to classify the samples into each of their respective families.
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Figure 11: Confusion Matrix on Full Image Data Using Lanczos Filter
4.3.2 CNN on Poisoned Dataset
As discussed from Section 3.3, we have trained a CNN model on the poisoned
dataset based on the same optimum architecture. The training data was based on a
50:50 split of real and fake samples. We chose 400 real samples from each family and
400 fake samples of each family for training the model. We then scored 100 samples of
real and fake and 200 samples of poisoned data using the trained model. We observe
these results for the three classifications-
1. Scoring Real Samples - Figure 17 shows the confusion matrix for classifying
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Table 9: Classification Report: Resized with Lanczos Filter
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support
0 0.80 0.70 0.75 474
1 0.97 0.97 0.97 349
2 0.78 0.87 0.82 234
3 0.93 0.95 0.94 301
4 0.59 0.69 0.64 287
5 0.84 0.82 0.83 341
6 0.97 0.99 0.98 421
7 0.99 0.99 0.99 286
8 0.47 0.50 0.48 399
9 0.87 0.90 0.88 381
10 0.76 0.56 0.65 393
11 0.88 0.84 0.86 398
12 0.86 0.91 0.88 330
13 0.95 0.96 0.96 275
14 0.76 0.79 0.77 501
15 0.99 0.99 0.99 1139
16 0.95 0.97 0.96 496
17 0.97 0.96 0.96 363
accuracy 0.86 7368
macro avg 0.85 0.85 0.85 7368
weighted avg 0.86 0.86 0.86 7368
100 real samples against the trained model. Its classification report is constructed
in Table 13.
The real samples are classified with an accuracy of 62%. This accuracy is great
when we compare these results with the results from Section 4.3.1. We can
see at some individual results which have performed a lot better. For example,
alureon classification has significantly improved from 33% to 80%.
2. Scoring Fake Samples - Figure 18 shows the confusion matrix for classifying
100 fake samples against the trained model. Its classification report is constructed
in Table 14.
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Figure 12: Confusion Matrix on Header Images Dataset
Figure 13: Generator Architecture
This is an interesting result as the fake samples are also getting better classified
into their own family. Although, this is because of inclusion similar fake samples
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Table 10: Classification Report: Header Images Dataset
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support
0 0.85 0.82 0.84 410
1 0.99 1.00 0.99 350
2 0.89 0.91 0.90 248
3 0.96 0.96 0.96 326
4 0.89 0.89 0.89 335
5 0.84 0.89 0.86 326
6 1.00 1.00 1.00 436
7 0.99 0.99 0.99 268
8 0.66 0.70 0.68 423
9 0.93 0.95 0.94 384
10 0.86 0.77 0.81 343
11 0.91 0.94 0.93 352
12 0.92 0.97 0.95 322
13 0.98 0.97 0.97 290
14 0.84 0.82 0.83 576
15 0.99 0.98 0.99 1072
16 0.96 0.97 0.96 557
17 0.99 0.97 0.98 346
accuracy 0.92 7364
macro avg 0.91 0.92 0.91 7364
weighted avg 0.92 0.92 0.92 7364











Figure 14: Discriminator Architecture
Figure 15: Generator & Discriminator Loss
in training. The 77% accuracy is a strong classification when compared with
previous results.
3. Scoring Poisoned Samples - Figure 19 shows the confusion matrix for clas-
sifying 200 poisoned samples consisting of 100 fake and 100 real samples of
each family against the trained model. Its classification report is constructed in
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Figure 16: Confusion Matrix on Consolidated Dataset
Table 15.
The poisoned test samples show a 77% accuracy which is great considering the
disparities between the real and fake data existing in the same data.
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Figure 17: Confusion Matrix: Real Samples Classification
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Table 12: Classification Report: Consolidated Dataset
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support
0 0.48 0.54 0.51 114
1 0.71 0.73 0.72 143
2 0.95 0.96 0.95 153
3 0.69 0.76 0.73 144
4 0.75 0.90 0.81 115
5 0.58 0.58 0.58 142
6 0.82 0.78 0.80 174
7 0.73 0.85 0.79 128
8 0.39 0.44 0.41 131
9 0.80 0.85 0.82 124
10 0.47 0.59 0.52 133
11 0.76 0.74 0.75 165
12 0.93 0.99 0.96 150
13 0.93 0.95 0.94 149
14 0.99 0.93 0.96 153
15 0.86 0.93 0.89 131
16 0.22 0.18 0.20 201
17 0.88 0.87 0.87 152
18 0.72 0.82 0.77 126
19 0.88 0.67 0.76 212
20 0.39 0.27 0.32 224
21 0.63 0.68 0.65 145
22 0.61 0.73 0.66 102
23 0.66 0.79 0.72 117
24 0.64 0.50 0.56 199
25 0.92 0.82 0.87 148
26 0.92 0.91 0.92 160
27 0.88 0.82 0.85 169
28 0.45 0.61 0.52 115
29 0.74 0.84 0.79 128
30 0.86 0.88 0.87 151
31 0.89 0.85 0.87 179
32 0.90 0.94 0.92 147
33 0.96 0.83 0.89 170
34 0.78 0.72 0.75 168
35 0.84 0.82 0.83 138
accuracy 0.74 5400
macro avg 0.74 0.75 0.74 5400
weighted avg 0.74 0.74 0.74 5400
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Table 13: Classification Report:Real Sample
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support
0 0.80 0.36 0.50 11
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 3
2 1.00 0.67 0.80 6
3 0.83 0.71 0.77 7
4 0.60 0.50 0.55 6
5 0.25 0.33 0.29 3
6 1.00 0.75 0.86 4
7 1.00 1.00 1.00 7
8 0.18 0.29 0.22 7
9 0.20 0.50 0.29 2
10 0.17 0.10 0.12 10
11 1.00 0.75 0.86 4
12 0.50 0.67 0.57 6
13 0.75 0.75 0.75 4
14 0.40 1.00 0.57 4
15 1.00 1.00 1.00 2
16 0.86 0.86 0.86 7
17 0.83 0.83 0.83 6
accuracy 0.62 99
macro avg 0.69 0.67 0.66 99
weighted avg 0.68 0.62 0.62 99
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Figure 18: Confusion Matrix: Fake Samples Classification
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Table 14: Classification Report: Fake Samples
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support
0 0.80 0.67 0.73 6
1 0.75 0.50 0.60 6
2 0.67 0.50 0.57 4
3 0.60 1.00 0.75 3
4 1.00 0.62 0.77 8
5 0.50 0.60 0.55 5
6 0.75 1.00 0.86 6
7 1.00 1.00 1.00 8
8 0.50 0.60 0.55 5
9 0.60 0.75 0.67 4
10 0.71 0.83 0.77 6
11 0.50 0.67 0.57 3
12 0.67 0.80 0.73 5
13 0.80 0.80 0.80 5
14 0.86 0.86 0.86 7
15 1.00 0.86 0.92 7
16 1.00 1.00 1.00 6
17 1.00 0.60 0.75 5
accuracy 0.77 99
macro avg 0.76 0.76 0.75 99
weighted avg 0.80 0.77 0.77 99
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Figure 19: Confusion Matrix: Poisoned Samples Classification
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Table 15: Classification Report: Poisoned Samples Classification
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support
0 0.33 0.50 0.40 6
1 0.88 0.64 0.74 11
2 0.79 0.85 0.81 13
3 0.64 0.70 0.67 10
4 0.50 0.60 0.55 10
5 0.62 0.62 0.62 13
6 1.00 1.00 1.00 12
7 0.92 0.92 0.92 13
8 0.36 0.50 0.42 8
9 0.67 0.89 0.76 9
10 0.73 0.57 0.64 14
11 1.00 0.79 0.88 19
12 0.83 0.83 0.83 6
13 0.85 0.85 0.85 13
14 0.75 0.86 0.80 7
15 0.91 0.83 0.87 12
16 1.00 0.91 0.95 11
17 1.00 0.83 0.91 12
accuracy 0.77 199
macro avg 0.76 0.76 0.76 199
weighted avg 0.80 0.77 0.78 199
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion & Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
In this research, we were able to convert malware executable files into images
and analyzed resizing techniques and their impact on classification of data. We also
created an image from the headers of the malware files by reading the start bytes and
found that they give optimum results. To try to break this classifier, we generated
fake samples using AC-GAN and found that the CNN model’s classification accuracy
deteriorated with the inclusion of fake samples. By retraining the model with a
poisoned dataset, we obtain better classification results than before.
5.2 Future Work
Fake malwares can be generated using other techniques like HMM as well. It
could be worth exploring to create images from the fake executable byte codes. Other
techniques like data obfuscation can also be performed to generate similar samples
of data from a particular family. It can be interesting to see what can happen if we
introduce fake samples generated from multiple techniques in the same dataset.
The classification techniques used in this research project were limited to CNN
to maintain the consistency in results we obtain so that it is easier to analyze the
effects of introduction of fake samples and other image generation techniques. Other
techniques like Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLPs) and ResNets have also shown great
classification results on other datasets.
GANs are themselves a broad area of research. Other GAN models like DC-GAN
(Deep Convolutional GANs), Progressive GANs and Cycle GANs can be used to gener-
ate the fake images. The results of AC-GAN were based on BinaryCrossEntropy Loss.
There are other loss functions like SSIM (Structural Similarity Index Measurement)
which can also be explored in training AC-GAN models.
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A.1 Binary Classification Results
As malware belonging to obfuscator, vundo and alureon families had a low
accuracy among the multi-class classification results, it implies that the similarity
between these malware is more. Hence, to bolster their classification, a binary
classication between them is performed. The subsequent sub-sections illustrate the
findings of these experiments.
A.1.1 Obfuscator & Rbot
Figure A.20: Confusion Matrix: Obfuscator & Rbot
Table A.16: Classification Report: Obfuscator & Rbot
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support
0 0.91 0.92 0.91 431
1 0.89 0.87 0.88 305
accuracy 0.90 736
macro avg 0.90 0.89 0.90 736
weighted avg 0.90 0.90 0.90 736
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A.1.2 Obfuscator & Vundo
Figure A.21: Confusion Matrix: Obfuscator & Vundo
Table A.17: Classification Report: Obfuscator & Vundo
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support
0 0.91 0.88 0.90 451
1 0.90 0.93 0.91 518
accuracy 0.91 969
macro avg 0.91 0.90 0.90 969
weighted avg 0.91 0.91 0.90 969
A.1.3 Alureon & Vundo
Table A.18: Classification Report: Alureon & Vundo
Class Precision Recall F1-Score Support
0 0.95 0.94 0.94 389
1 0.96 0.97 0.96 547
accuracy 0.95 936
macro avg 0.95 0.95 0.95 936
weighted avg 0.95 0.95 0.95 936
48
Figure A.22: Confusion Matrix: Alureon & Vundo
A.2 Loss Graphs
This section consists of the loss graphs of each experiment.
Figure A.23: CNN: Winwebsec & Zbot Loss
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Figure A.24: CNN: Full Image Dataset Loss
Figure A.25: CNN: Hamming Interpolation Loss
Figure A.26: CNN: Bicubic Interpolation Loss
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Figure A.27: CNN: Lanczos Interpolation Loss
Figure A.28: CNN: Header Image Data Loss
Figure A.29: CNN: Consolidated Dataset Loss
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Figure A.30: CNN: Poisoned Dataset Loss
Figure A.31: CNN: Obfuscator & Rbot Loss
Figure A.32: CNN: Obfuscator & Vundo Loss
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Figure A.33: CNN: Alureon & Vundo Loss
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